We continue the study of Bochet et al. [4, 5] and Moulin and Sethuraman [20, 21] on fair allocation in bipartite networks. In these models, there is a moneyless market, in which a non-storable, homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. While the egalitarian rule of Bochet et al. [4, 5] satisfies pareto optimality, no envy and strategyproof , it is not consistent. On the other hand, the work of Moulin and Sethuraman [20, 21] is related to consistent allocations and rules that are extensions of the uniform rule. We bridge the two streams of work by introducing the edge fair mechanism which is both consistent and groupstrategyproof. On the way, we explore the "price of consistency" i.e. how the notion of consistency is fundamentally incompatible with certain notions of fairness like Lorenz Dominance and No-Envy. The current work also introduces the idea of strong invariance as desideratum for groupstrategyproofness and generalizes the proof of Chandramouli and Sethuraman [8] to a more broader class of mechanisms. Finally, we conclude with the study of the edge fair mechanism in a transshipment model where the strategic agents are on the links connecting different supply/demand locations.
Introduction
We study the problem of fair division of a maximum flow in a capacitated bipartite network. This model generalizes a number of matching and allocation problems that have been studied extensively over the years, motivated by applications in school choice, kidney exchange etc. The common feature in these application contexts is that the associated market is moneyless, so that fairness is achieved by equalizing the allocation as much as possible. This last caveat is to account for additional considerations, such as Pareto efficiency and strategyproofness, that may be part of the planner's objective.
Specifically, we are given a bipartite network G = (S ∪ D, E), and we think of S as the set of supply nodes and D as the set of demand nodes. Each arc (i, j) ∈ E connects a supply node i to a demand node j, and has capacity u ij ≥ 0. There is a single commodity (the resource) that is available at the supply nodes and needs to be transferred to the demand nodes: we assume that supply node i has s i units of the resource, and demand node j requires d j units of it. The capacity of an arc (i, j) is interpreted as an upper bound on the direct transfer from supply node i to demand node j. The goal is to satisfy the demands "as much as possible" using the available supplies, while also respecting the capacity constraints on the arcs.
A well-studied special case of our problem is that of allocating a single resource (or allocating the resource available at a single location) amongst a set of agents with varying (objectively verifiable) claims on it. This is the special case when there is a single supply node that is connected to every one of the demand nodes in the network by an arc of large-enough capacity. If the sum of the claims of the agents exceeds the amount of the resource available, the problem is a standard rationing problem (studied in the literature as "bankruptcy" problems or "claims" problems). There is an extensive literature devoted to such problems that has resulted in a thorough understanding of many natural methods including the proportional method, the uniform gains method, and the uniform losses method. A different view of this special case is that of allocating a single resource amongst agents with single-peaked preferences over their net consumption. Under this view, studied by Sprumont [26] , Thomson [30] and many others, the goal is to design a mechanism for allocating the resource that satisfies appealing efficiency and equity properties, while also eliciting the preferences of the agents truthfully. The uniform rule, which is essentially an adaptation of the uniform gains method applied to the reported peaks of the agents, occupies a central position in this literature: it is strategy-proof (in fact, group strategy-proof), and finds an envy-free allocation that Lorenz dominates every other efficient allocation; furthermore, this rule is also consistent. (We will define consistency, Lorenz dominance, etc. precisely in Section 2.) A natural two-sided version of Sprumont's model has agents initially endowed with some amount of the resource, so that agents now fall into two categories: someone endowed with less than her peak is a potential demander, whereas someone endowed with more than her peak is a potential supplier. The simultaneous presence of demanders and suppliers creates an opportunity to trade, and the obvious adaptation of the uniform rule gives their peak consumption to agents on the short side of the market, while those on the long side are uniformly rationed (see [16] , [3] ). This is again equivalent to a standard rationing problem because the nodes on the short side of the market can be collapsed to a single node. The model we consider generalizes this by assuming that the resource can only be transferred between certain pairs of agents. Such constraints are typically logistical (which supplier can reach which demander in an emergency situation, which worker can handle which job request), but could be subjective as well (as when a hospital chooses to refuse a new patient by declaring red status). This complicates the analysis of efficient (Pareto optimal) allocations, because short demand and short supply typically coexist in the same market.
The general model we consider in this paper has been the subject of much recent research and was first formulated by Bochet et al. [4, 5] . The authors work with a bipartite network in both papers and assume that each node is populated by an agent with single-peaked preferences over his consumption of the resource: thus, each supply node has an "ideal" supply (its peak) quantity, and each demand node has an ideal demand. These preferences are assumed to be private information, and Bochet et al. [4, 5] propose a clearinghouse mechanism that collects from each agent only their "peaks" and picks Pareto-optimal transfers with respect to the reported peaks. Further, they show that their mechanism is strategy-proof in the sense that it is a dominant strategy for each agent to report their peaks truthfully. While the models in the two papers are very similar, there is also a critical difference: in [5] , the authors require that no agent be allowed to send or receive any more than their peaks, whereas in [4] the authors assume that the demands must be satisfied exactly (and so some supply nodes will have to send more than their peak amounts). The mechanism of Bochet et al.-the egalitarian mechanism-generalizes the uniform rule, and finds an allocation that Lorenz dominates all Pareto efficient allocations. Later, Chandramouli and Sethuraman [8] show that the egalitarian mechanism is in fact group strategyproof: it is a dominant strategy for any group of agents (suppliers or demanders) to report their peaks truthfully 1 . Szwagrzak [27, 29, 28] expands the study of allocation rules in these networked economies by introducing broader class of mechanisms with various fairness properties. His work also develops alternative characterizations of these mechanisms (in p articular, the egalitarian mechanism) and provides a unified view of the allocation problem on networks. Szwagrzak [27] studies the property of contraction invariance of an allocation rule: when the set of feasible allocations contracts such that the optimal allocation is still in this smaller set, then the allocation rule should continue to select the same allocation. He shows that the egalitarian rule is contraction invariant. These results suggest that the egalitarian mechanism may be the correct generalization of the uniform rule to the network setting. However, it is fairly easy to show that the egalitarian mechanism is not consistent: if the link from a supply node i and demand node j is dropped, and s i and d j are adjusted accordingly, applying the egalitarian mechanism to the reduced problem will not necessarily give the same allocation to the agents. Motivated by this observation, Moulin and Sethuraman [20, 21] study rules for network rationing problems that extend a given rule for a standard rationing problem while preserving consistency and other natural axioms. In particular, they propose a family of rules that generalize the uniform rule to the bipartite network setting. While they are able to show that their extension satisfies consistency, it is not known if any of these rules is strategyproof.
Our main contribution in this paper is a new group strategy-proof mechanism (the "edgefair" mechanism) that is a consistent extension of the uniform rule. Our proof shows that for any Pareto efficient mechanism, group strategyproofness is equivalent to a property that we call strong invariance that is often straightforward to verify. (In particular, the group strategy-proofness of the egalitarian mechanism that we established in an earlier paper also follows immediately, even if one works with a capacitated model.) Along the way we show that consistency imposes very severe restrictions: for instance, no consistent rule can find allocations that are envy-free, even in the limited sense introduced by Bochet et al. [5] for such problems. The mechanism we propose does not find the Lorenz optimal allocation, but we show that no consistent mechanism can. We consider a related model where the supplies and demands at the nodes are given, but that each edge is controlled by an independent agent with single-peaked preferences on the amount transferred along that edge. The planner still wishes to implement a maximum flow (it is now a design constraint), and the goal is to divide this reasonably among the edges of the network. For this model we show that a Lorenz optimal allocation need not exist, but that our mechanism can still be applied and finds a reasonable division of the max-flow.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we consider the standard model of maximizing the total flow in a capacitated bipartite network. We state the well-known GallaiEdmonds decomposition, and describe the edge-fair algorithm that selects a particular max-flow for any given problem. An easy argument shows that the edge-fair algorithm makes a consistent selection of max-flows across related problems. Section 3 considers the model in which agents are located on the nodes of the network and have single-peaked preferences over their allocations-the equivalence of group strategy-proofness and strong invariance, and the fact that the edge-fair rule satisfies strong invariance are the key results in this section. In section 4 we turn to the problem in which agents are on the edges of the network, and study the implications of consistency.
2 Maximum Flows and the Edge-Fair Algorithm
Model
We consider the problem of transferring a single commodity from a set S of suppliers to a set D of demanders using a set E of edges. Supplier i has s i ≥ 0 units of the commodity, and demander j wishes to consume d j ≥ 0. Associated with each edge is a distinct supplier-demander pair: the edge e = (i, j) links supplier i to demander j, and has a non-negative, possibly infinite, capacity u ij . Transfer of the commodity is allowed between supplier i and demander j only if (i, j) ∈ E, in which case at most u ij units of the commodity can be transferred along this edge 2 . The goal is to find an "optimal" transfer of the commodity from the suppliers to the demanders. We let G = (S ∪ D, E) be the natural bipartite graph and we speak of the problem (G, s, d, u) .
We use the following notation. For any subset T ⊆ S, the set of demanders compatible with the suppliers in T is f (T ) = {j ∈ D|(i, j) ∈ E, i ∈ T }. Similarly, the set of suppliers compatible with the demanders in C ⊆ D is g(C) = {i ∈ S|(i, j) ∈ E, j ∈ C}. We abuse notation and say f (i) and g(j) instead of f ({i}) and g({j}) respectively. For any subsets T ⊆ S, C ⊆ D, x T := i∈T x i and y C := j∈C y j .
A transfer of the commodity from S to D is realized by a flow ϕ, which specifies the amount of the commodity transferred from supplier i to demander j using the edge (i, j) ∈ E. The flow ϕ induces an allocation vector for each supplier and each demander as follows:
be the set of feasible flows for the problem (G, s, d, u). A feasible flow ϕ * is a maximum flow if
Let F * (G, s, d, u) be the set of maximum flows for the problem (G, s, d, u). For reasons that will be clearer later, we shall focus mostly on finding a maximum flow for any given problem. As a result, it is important to understand the set F * (G, s, d, u), which we turn to next.
The Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition. The problem under consideration is the well-known problem of finding a maximum flow in a capacitated bipartite network. The following result characterizes the structure of maximum flows and is essentially a version of the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition. It can proved by a straightforward application of the max-flow min-cut theorem. 
Proof : Let λ := (λ i ) i∈S be non-negative. Construct the following network G(λ): introduce a source s and a sink t; arcs of the form (s, i) for each supplier i with capacity λ i , arcs of the form (j, t) for each demander j with capacity d j ; an arc of capacity u ij from supplier i to demander j if supplier i and demander j share a link. Consider now a maximum s-t flow ϕ in the network G(s). By the max-flow min-cut theorem, there is a cut C (a cut is a subset of nodes that contains the source s but not the sink t) whose capacity is equal to that of the max-flow. Let X be the set of suppliers in C and Y be the set of demanders in C. If the min-cut is not unique, it is again well-known (see [17] ) that there is a min-cut with the largest X (largest in the sense of inclusion), and a min-cut with the smallest X (again in the sense of inclusion). Call these sets X and X. Define S − := X and S + := S \ S − ; and define
We note that the partition is uniquely determined for each problem. 3 Let C be the cut that has precisely X as its set of suppliers and Y as its set of demanders. We claim that Y ⊆ f (X). For otherwise, there is a supplier j ∈ Y \ f (X) who contributes d j to the capacity of the cut C, and omitting j from C would reduce this capacity by d j > 0, resulting in a smaller capacity cut. Moreover, by the max-flow min-cut theorem, every edge (i, j) with i ∈ C and j ∈ C must carry flow equal to its capacity, and that the value of the max-flow is precisely the sum of the capacites of such edges. Thus, ϕ ij = u ij for every edge (i, j) with i ∈ S − and j ∈ D − ; the edge (s, i) carries a flow of s i for each supplier i ∈ S + ; and the edge (j, t) carries a flow of d j for each demander j ∈ D + . The lemma now follows.
Axioms
We briefly describe some key axioms that we want our rules to satisfy.
Edge consistency. The key axiom in our paper is edge consistency (or simply consistency, hereafter). Suppose we have a rule ϕ that picks a flow z for a given problem (G, s, d, u). Fix an edge (i, j) ∈ G connecting supply node i and demand node j, and define the reduced problem as follows: the new graph is G ′ = G \ {e}; the supplies and demands of all the nodes other than i and j stay the same,
and the capacities on the edges that remain stay the same. Let z ′ be the flow picked by the rule ϕ for the reduced problem (G ′ , s ′ , d ′ , u). The rule ϕ is edge-consistent if z = z ′ for every reduced problem G ′ that can be obtained from G by omitting an edge. Observe that z restricted to the edges in G ′ is a max-flow for the reduced problem, and edge-consistency requires that the rule not "reallocate" the flow amongst the remaining edges if some edge is dropped from the problem and the corresponding supplies and demands are adjusted in the obvious way.
Continuity. The mapping ϕ : (G, s, d, u) → R |E| is jointly continuous in s, d, and u. Roughly speaking, this simply says that a rule is continuous only if small changes in supplies, demands or edge-capacities result in small changes on the edge-flows picked by the rule.
Symmetry. Consider any permutation π of the supply nodes and a permutation σ of the demand nodes. Define the graph G ′ as follows: (i, j) ∈ G if and only if (π(i), σ(j)) ∈ G ′ . The supplies s ′ and demands d ′ are defined analogously by permuting the original supplies and demands according to the respective permutations. Likewise for the capacities. A rule ϕ is symmetric if and only if for every π and every σ, z ij = z ′ π(j),σ(j) where z and z ′ are the outcomes of the rule for the problems (G, s, d, u) and (G ′ , s ′ , d ′ , u ′ ) respectively.
The Edge-Fair Algorithm
Given two max-flows ϕ and ϕ ′ sorted in increasing order we say that ϕ lexicographically dominates ϕ ′ if the first coordinate k in which ϕ and ϕ ′ are not equal is such that ϕ k > ϕ ′ k . (Note that the k-th smallest entry in the flows ϕ and ϕ ′ may be on different edges.) The max-flow ϕ is lex-optimal if it lexicographically dominates all other max-flows F * (G, s, d, u). It is clear that a lex-optimal flow exists and is unique. 4 The edge-fair algorithm, formally described next, finds this lex-optimal flow by solving a sequence of linear programming problems.
We fix a problem (G,
, the set of all max-flows for the given problem. The edge-fair algorithm (or rule) proceeds iteratively, solving a linear programming problem in each step. In any iteration t, it starts with a candidate set of max-flows F t , and a set of active edges E t , and solves the following linear programming problem:
Suppose λ * t+1 is the optimal value of this linear programming problem. Then,
and
The edges in E t \E t+1 are declared inactive, and the algorithm proceeds to the next value of t if any active edges remain. As at least one edge becomes inactive in each step, the algorithm terminates in O(|E|) steps. It is often useful to think about this algorithm in a different, but equivalent way. First, observe that any edge whose flow is fixed in every max-flow will carry exactly this amount in the outcome of the edge-fair algorithm as well. Thus, we focus only on those edges (i, j) with the property that 0 < ϕ ij < u ij for some flow ϕ ∈ F * (G, s, d, u). In particular, from the observations in proposition 1 on the set of Pareto Optimal solutions, we could fix z ij = u ij for ij ∈ G(S − , D + ) and z ij = 0 for ij ∈ G(S + , D − ) and remove these edges from the network. The reduced problem now decomposes into 2 disjoint components: one in which the suppliers are rationed (and every demander gets what they ask for), and the other in which the demanders are rationed, but each supplier sends his entire supply. As the algorithm is completely symmetric, we simply describe it for the case of rationed demanders. In this case each supplier will be allocated his peak in every max-flow; and any flow that respects edge-capacities while allocating each supplier his peak, while allocating each demander no more than his peak is a max-flow. Thus, the linear programming problem that must be solved in each step can be explicitly described: the only edges that need to be considered are those between S + and D − .
Maximize λ t+1 subject to
Initially, every such edge is active, and the algorithm tries to maximize the minimum amount carried by an active edge in any max-flow.
Theorem 1 The edge fair rule is symmetric, continuous, and consistent.
Proof: Symmetry follows because the rule is invariant, by definition, to permutations of supply nodes, demand nodes, and edge-capacities. Continuity is equally clear. Consistency is also immediate by the definition of the algorithm: we may assume that the edge (i, j) that is dropped to obtain the reduced problem is still present but carries a constant flow z ij , where z is the outcome chosen by the rule for the original problem. Thus, the set of feasible solutions to the reduced problem is a subset of the set of feasible solutions to the original problem at every stage of the algorithm: As the outcome z for the original problem is a member of both sets, it will be chosen in both cases.
Example. We illustrate the algorithm on the problem shown in Figure 1 with 8 supply nodes and 8 demand nodes. All edges have infinite capacity except for the edges (s7, d3) and (s8, d4), which have capacity 0.5 each. It is clear that these two capacitated edges must carry 0.5 unit of flow each in every max-flow, so their flow can be fixed; by consistency, we could omit these edges from further consideration, and adjust the supplies at s7 and at s8 and the demands at d3 and at d4 down by 0.5 unit each. Similarly, the edges (s3, d5) and (s4, d6) carry no flow in any max-flow, and so can be omitted as well. The problem now decomposes into two components: one involving the first 4 supply and demand nodes, where the demand nodes are rationed in any max-flow; and the other involving the last 4 supply and demand nodes, where the supply nodes are rationed in any max-flow. First consider the problem involving the first four supply and demand nodes. Each supply node sends all its supply, whereas each demand node receives at most what it wants. The edge-fair algorithm applied to this problem gives the following flow: first z 21 = 2; then z 32 = z 33 = z 34 = 7/3; then z 44 = 3, after which z 22 = 6, and finally z 12 = 10. The resulting allocation for the demanders in this problem is (12, 25/3, 7/3, 16/3); recall that demand nodes 3 and 4 also get 0.5 units of flow from suppliers s7 and s8 respectively, so the final allocation for the demand nodes is (12, 25/3, 17/6, 35/6). Now consider the edge-fair algorithm applied to the last 4 supply and demand nodes. Here the supply nodes are rationed whereas the demand is exactly met. It is easy to check that the the edge-fair rule sends a flow of 2/3 on each edge in this component so that the resulting allocation for the supply nodes is (2, 2, 4/3, 4/3); as the last 2 supply nodes also send 0.5 units of flow to the other component, the final allocation for these supply nodes is (2, 2, 11/6, 11/6).
To summarize, the edge-fair algorithm applied to this example results in an allocation of (10, 8, 7, 3, 2, 2, 11/6, 11/6) for the supply nodes and (12, 25/3, 17/6, 35/6, 4/3, 4/3, 2, 2) for the demand nodes. In contrast, it can be verified that the egalitarian allocation results in an allocation of (10, 8, 7, 3 , 23/12, 23/12, 23/12, 23/12) for the supply nodes, and (10, 8, 11/2, 11/2, 4/3, 4/3, 2, 2) for the demand nodes. This also highlights an important distinction between the edge-fair allocation and the egalitarian one: in our example, demand nodes 3 and 4 have identical demands, and it is possible to give them the same allocation, as shown by the Egalitarian allocation; the edge-fair rule, however, treats these demand nodes differently. In particular, demand node 4 is better off under the edge-fair rule because of its improved connectivity.
Model 1: Agents only on nodes
In this section we consider the version of the problem where the nodes of the network are populated by agents. Specifically, each supply node i is occupied by a supplier i and each demand node j is occipied by a demander j. Thus, we our problem becomes one of transferring a single commodity from a set S of suppliers to a set D of demanders using the set E of edges. The edge e has a capacity u e that is known to all the agents. A transfer of the commodity from S to D is realized by a flow ϕ, which specifies the amount of the commodity transferred from supplier i to demander j using the edge (i, j) ∈ E. The flow ϕ induces an allocation vector for each supplier and each demander as follows:
As we shall see in a moment, suppliers and demanders only care about their net transfers, and not on how these transfers are distributed across the agents on the other side.
Each supplier i has single-peaked preferences 5 R i (with corresponding indifference relation I i ) over her net transfer x i , with peak s i , and each demander j has single-peaked preferences R j (I j ) over her net transfer y j , with peak d j . We write R for the set of single peaked preferences over R + , and R S∪D for the set of preference profiles.
We think of the graph G as fixed, and focus our attention on mechanisms that elicit preferences from the agents and maps the reported preference profile to a flow. For reasons that will be clear later, we focus on allocation rules that are peak only: the flow (and hence the induced allocation vector for the suppliers and demanders) depends on the reported preference profile of the agents only through their peaks. Thus it makes sense to talk of the problem (s, d): this emphasizes the fact that the peaks of the agents are private information whereas the other part of the problem (specifically, the graph G and the edge capacities u) are known. To summarize: suppliers and demanders report their peaks; the allocation rule is applied to the graph G with edge-capacities u, and the data (s, d) where s and d are the reported peaks of the suppliers, and demanders. Our focus will be on mechanisms in which no agent has an incentive to misreport his peak.
A mechanism is said to be strategyproof if for any graph G it is a weakly dominant strategy for an agent to truthfully report their peak. It is group strategyproof if for any graph G it is a weakly dominant strategy for any coalition of agents to truthfully report their peaks.
Efficiency and Equity
Pareto Optimality: A feasible net transfer (x, y) as defined in the previous section is Pareto Optimal if there is no other allocation (x ′ , y ′ ) such that every agent is weakly better off and atleast one agent is strictly better off in it. In mathematical terms, if R i and I i denote the preference and indifference relations respectively for agent i, then
The following result shows that set of Pareto optimal transfers for peak-only rules is intimately related to the set of max-flows. 
5 Writing Pi for agent i's strict preference, we have for every xi, x
(b) The transfers (x, y) induced by a feasible flow ϕ are Pareto optimal if and only if
where
We are particularly interested in Pareto optimal flows and transfers in which no supplier or demander is allocated more than their peak: such solutions are Pareto optimal for any singlepeaked preferences of the agents as long as the peaks are s and d respectively. Following Bochet et al., we call this set P O * and note that (x, y) ∈ P O * if and only if (x, y) is Pareto optimal, x ≤ s, and y ≤ d. In particular, (x, y) ∈ P O * if and only if
In the rest of the section, by a Pareto optimal solution we mean a flow inducing net transfers (x, y) ∈ P O * . We proceed now to discussions related to fairness.
No Envy: A rule (x, y) ∈ F(G, s, d, u) satisfies No Envy if for any preference profile R ∈ R S∪D and i, j ∈ S such that x j P i x i , there exists no (x ′ , y ′ ) such that
k for all k ∈ S\{i, j}; y l = y ′ l for all l ∈ D and (10)
and a similar statement when we interchange the role of suppliers and demanders.
Equal Treatment of Equals: A rule (x, y) ∈ F(G, s, d, u) satisfies Equal Treatment of Equals if for any preference profile R ∈ R S∪D and i, j ∈ S such that s i = s j , if x j = x i then there exists no (x ′ , y ′ ) such that
If an allocation rule always results in a Pareto optimal allocation and satisfies No Envy, then it also satisfies Equal Treatment of Equals (Refer to Proposition 5 in Bochet et al. [5] ).
The egalitarian rule of Bochet et al. [5] is a selection from the Pareto set P O * as is the edgefair allocation rule. They also show that the egalitarian rule is envy-free but the inconsistency of the rule follows from figure 2 where we remove the node d 1 from the network on the left. The Figure 2 : Inconsistency of the egalitarian rule and envy of edge fair rule egalitarian allocation on the reduced network improves the allocation of s 2 by sending 1 unit of flow on the edge s 2 − d 2 We have already seen that the edge-fair rule is also consistent. But here is an exmple where the edge-fair rule has envy. But one can show that no consistent rule is envy-free (under P O * ) using the same example.
Lemma 2 There is no mechanism which is simultaneously envy free for agents on the nodes and edge consistent under P O *
Let us consider the same example as in figure 2. Suppose the mechanism is envy free: Any envy free solution should allocate 2 units to each supplier 1 and 2. This establishes a unique edge flow: (z 11 , z 21 , z 22 ) = (2, 0, 2). Lets remove the edge s 2 − d 2 with z 22 = 2 units allocation. If this mechanism was also consistent, then on this reduced network the mechanism should have an allocation (z 11 , z 21 ) = (2, 0) on the edges. But the no-envy solution on this reduced graph would allocate (z 11 , z 21 ) = (1, 1) Now, suppose the given mechanism is edge consistent and lets say (z 11 , z 21 , z 22 ) = (2, 0, 2) is an allocation from some edge consistent rule. Removing the edge s 2 − d 2 , in the reduced graph the allocation from an edge consistent mechanism is (z 11 , z 21 ) = (2, 0) but this does not allocate a envy free solution for the nodes on the reduced graph. As a consequence, if the mechanism is edge consistent it cannot allocate (z 11 , z 21 , z 22 ) = (2, 0, 2) in the original network but this is the only envy free solution on that network. The same example also shows that any edge consistent mechanism violates the property equal treatment of equals.
These results imply that no rule can be Pareto efficient, Envy-free and Consistent. Both the egalitarian and edge-fair rules find Pareto efficient allocations; where they differ is that the egalitarian rule relaxes consistency but is envy-free, but the edge-fair rule relaxes envy-freeness but is consistent. Bochet et al. [5] show that the egalitarian rule is strategyproof; and in our earlier paper, we show that it is in fact group strategyproof. A natural question is if the edge-fair rule enjoys these properties as well. We answer this question in the affirmative in the next section.
Strategic Issues
We start with a formal definition of strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness. Informally, a mechanism is strategyproof if it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for each agent to reveal his peak truthfully; and a mechanism is group strategyproof if it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for any group of agents to reveal their peaks truthfully.
Peak Group Strategyproof:
These properties are closely related to an invariance property that we formally define below:
and a similar invariance property can be defined with respect to the demanders.
Lemma 3
For any rule that always selects an allocation (x, y) ∈ P O * , strategyproofness and invariance are equivalent.
Proof: First we show that, under P O * , strategyproofness implies invariance: As the allocation is in P O * we have x i ≤ s i . Thus, to prove invariance we need to show that when x i < s i , and s ′ i ≥ x i we have x ′ i = x i . Suppose not and we have x ′ i < x i . Then agent i benefits by misreporting his peak as s i when his true peak is s ′ i , which violates strategyproofness. Similarly, if x ′ i > x i , we can construct a profile R * such that x ′ i P i * x i . As a P O * + Strategyproof rule is peak-monotonic and as a consequence own peak only (Bochet et al. [5] ), x i (R * i , R −i ) = x i (R). Hence, i benefits by sreporting s ′ i when his true peak is s i , which violates strategyproofness again. We now show the converse. Suppose the rule is not strategyproof. Under a P O * rule, x i = s i for every agent i ∈ S + , hence those agents never misreport. Every agent in i ∈ S − is such that x i ≤ s i . So, any agent who deviates and improves his allocation is such that s ′ i ≥ x i < s i and x ′ i P i x i . But this is not possible under an invariant rule. Hence, the rule is indeed strategyproof.
As we discussed earlier, the egalitarian rule is strategyproof, but is also group strategyproof. A natural question is if every strategyproof rule in our problem is also group strategyproof 6 .
As it turns out, the answer is "no" as shown by the following example. Consider the following mechanism, if the report of d 0 >= 5, then apply the egalitarian mechanism and if the report of d 0 < 5, follow the edge fair mechanism. This rule is clearly strategyproof. But agent d 0 and s 1 can collude such that agent d 0 misreports his peak as 4 (when his/her true peak is 6). This improves the allocation of agent s 1 by 1 unit, keeping the allocation of d 0 to be the same. We know from Bochet et al. [5] that strategyproofness of a rule can just be characterized by peak monotonicity and invariance. From the above discussion, strategyproofness is characterized by P O * and invariance. So, the natural question is what other additional property is needed to make a mechanism groupstrategyproof. Next, we show that any groupstrategyproof mechanism can be characterized by P O * and the following stronger invariance property:
and a similar strong invariance property can be defined with respect to the demanders. In other words, while invariance implies that the allocation of a supplier is unchanged whenever his peak misreport is above his allocation, strong invariance implies that the allocation of every agent is unchanged when a particular agent misreports his peak over his current allocation.
Our main result in this section is the following.
Theorem 2 Any mechanism that always selects an allocation from P O * satisfies strong invariance if and only if it is group strategy-proof.
Proof of theorem 2 We follow the proof technique introduced in Chandramouli & Sethuraman [8] for the first part of the theorem P O * , strong invariance =⇒ Peak GSP. 
Hence, every supplier i ∈ S − ∩ S ′ + sends weakly less flow to every agent connected to him. Hence,
We now consider the case Y ′ = {∅} and make observations about the suppliers
• When the report is s ′ , every such supplier can send flow only to the demanders in
this is because no link exists between agents in X ′ and demanders in
Hence, the remaining allocation has to be supplied from X ′ . Also, note that
These observations first lead to
Note that every demander ℓ in Y ′ ∩ B receives exactly his peak allocation d ℓ for a truthful report, so for the coalition B of demanders to do weakly better in the (G,
Finally,
For every supplier in A to be (weakly) better off when reporting s ′ , we must have x ′ k ≥ x k for each k ∈ X ′ . Combining this with inequalities (21) and (23), we conclude that all the inequalities in (21)- (23) hold as equations. In particular, x ′ k = x k for all k ∈ X ′ , and y ′ ℓ = y ℓ for ℓ ∈ Y ′ . Therefore, whether the report is s or is s ′ , the suppliers in X ′ send all of their flow only to the demanders in Y ′ and Y ′′ ; Moreover, the edges from X ′ to Y ′′ and S ′ − to Y ′ are saturated and that the demanders in Y ′ receive all of their flow only from the suppliers in X ′ and from the saturated edges from S ′ − Therefore, removing the suppliers in X ′ and the demanders in Y ′ and the saturated edges from X ′ to Y ′′ and S ′ − to Y ′ does not affect the allocation rule for either problem. As we picked a smallest counterexample, Y ′ must be empty.
We now turn to the other case. LetX :
• When the report is s ′ , every such demander can receive flow from the suppliers inX and
The supplier i ∈X send flow z ij = u ij to every demander j ∈Ỹ in the graph G(X,Ỹ ). Suppliers in S − send at most ij∈G(S − ,Ỹ ) u ij units of flow toỸ . But note that f (X) ⊇Ỹ and henceX can send flow to agents in D ′ + \Ỹ . Therefore
• When the report is s, the suppliers inX send flow only to the demanders in D − , and they can send flow only to the demanders they are connected to. so the suppliers inX can send flow only to the demanders inỸ ∪Ỹ . The agents inX can send at most ij∈G(X,Ỹ ) u ij units of flow to the agents inỸ . Also, the agents inỸ receive flow
Putting all this together, we have:
Note that every supplier k inX ∩ A receives exactly his peak allocation s k for a truthful report, so for the coalition A of suppliers to do weakly better in the (G,
For every demander in B to be (weakly) better off, we must have y ′ ℓ ≥ y ℓ for each ℓ ∈Ỹ . Combining this with inequalities (24)- (26), we conclude that all the inequalities in (24)- (26) hold as equations. In particular, x ′ k = x k for all k ∈X, and y ′ ℓ = y ℓ for ℓ ∈Ỹ . Therefore, whether the report is s or is s ′ , the suppliers inX send all of their flow only to the demanders inỸ and to the demanders inỸ ; Moreover, the edges fromX toỸ are saturated in both problems; So are the edges S − toỸ . and that the demanders inỸ receive all of their flow only from the suppliers inX and through the saturated edges from S − in both the problems. Therefore, removing the suppliers inX and the demanders inỸ and the saturated edges fromX toỸ and S − toỸ , we do not affect the allocation rule for either problem. As we picked a smallest counterexample,X must be empty.
We now establish that the decomposition does not change in a smallest counterexample. We already know that Y ′ = ∅, which implies D ′ − ⊆ D − . Suppose this containment is strict so that there is a demander j ∈ D − \ D ′ − . The links from S − to j are completely saturated. AsX = ∅, j receives flow only from the suppliers in S − ∩ S ′ − . Also, the flow on the edges from a supplier i ∈ S − ∩ S ′ − to j is such that z ′ ij ≤ u ij = z ij . Hence, the allocation for agent j is such that,
In both the cases, we have the equality y ′ j = d ′ j = y j . This implies, g(j) ∩ S − ∩ S ′ + = {∅}; The links from S − to j is saturated in both the problems (Follows from the fact that the given rule allocates the pareto value to the agents in both the networks, in particular y ′ k = d ′ k when the reports are d ′ ). Hence, we can remove those saturated edges and adjust the peaks of suppliers and demanders. The adjusted demand of agent j now is d ′ j = 0. w.l.o.g we can skip the case d ′ j = 0 as we can delete such a j to obtain the new decomposition or just place it in D − . Therefore
To complete the argument, let A be as defined earlier.
By a similar argument, we could establish
, causing i to do worse by reporting d ′ i . So any improving coalition A must be such that s ′ i ≥ x i for all i ∈ A − and d ′ i ≥ y i for all i ∈ B − . Now, we use the strong invariance property of the rule to conclude the result. Partition the agents in A − = A s ∪ A x where A s := {x i = s i |i ∈ A − } and A x := {x i < s i |i ∈ A − }. Lets start with an agent i ∈ A s , such an agent reports s ′ i > x i = s i and receives x ′ i = s i . Now, consider the alternate set of reports such that s ′′ j = s ′ j for all agents j = i and s ′′ i = s i and denote the corresponding network by G(S ′′ , D ′′ ). Strong invariance property implies that when the peak report s ′ ii ≥ x ′ i = s i then the allocation profile of the agents remains the same in the networks G(S ′ , D ′ ) and G(S ′′ , D ′′ ). Hence, we can find a smaller counterexample by removing i from A − . Hence, we can remove all the agents from A s and still find a smaller counterexample. Hence, we can assume the smallest counterexample A s = {∅}.
On similar lines, strong invariance property also implies that when an agent i with
Hence, applying this argument for each agent iteratively, we can conclude that when the set of agents in A x inflate their peaks, the allocation does not change i.e. x ′ i = x i ∀ i ∈ S. Hence, no agent improves his allocation under this rule, concluding the result. Now, we turn to prove the other direction of the result i.e. any rule that is P O * and peak GSP is strongly invariant. We discuss the result only for the suppliers, by symmetry a similar reasoning follows for the demanders. Suppose such a rule is not strongly invariant. Since agents in S + receive their peak, strong invariance property needs to be discussed only in the context of the agents in S − where x i ≤ s i . Now, consider an agent i ∈ S − such that x i < s i . Consider a report by agent i such that s ′ i ≥ x i . From Lemma 3 it follows that P O * + strategyproof implies invariance. Hence, x ′ i = s i . Furthermore, it follows from the earlier discussion that the decomposition and maximum flow does not change in this new problem. Hence,
Suppose, x ′ k = x k for some agent k ∈ S − , then there exists at least one agent j such that s j ≥ x ′ j > x j (agent j improves the allocation). Thus, the pair of agents i and j represent a colluding group who can deviate and (weakly) improve the allocation which contradicts the peak GSP property of the rule.
Corollary 1 The edge-fair rule is group strategyproof.
Proof. It is clear that the edge-fair rule always picks an allocation from P O * . By Theorem ??, the result follows if we show that the rule satisfies strong invariance. Following the arguments in the proof of that Theorem, it is enough to consider an agent i ∈ S − such that x i < s i and
In this case, the decomposition and maximum flow does not change, and the overall allocation does not change either: all the breakpoints in the edge-fair algorithm for the two cases are identical.
Note that the Egalitarian mechanism is group strategyproof for the same reason. This characterization identifies a class of peak group strategyproof mechanisms.
Ranking
One notion of fairness is that suppose two agents with different peaks have identical connections, then the agent with higher peak should have higher net allocation. This is true for the uniform rule where there is only 1 type of divisible good. This can be formalized in the following way for a general bipartite graph discussed here: ( A similar statement can be made about the demanders)
3. more edges more preference
We start with a proof of statement (i). Suppose x i > x j , we show a transfer from agent i to agent j is possible and contradicts the lexicographic solution on the edges. Construct a new solution
The allocation x ′ is clearly feasible and x does not lexicographic dominate x ′ . Hence, we arrive at a contradiction. Using the similar idea of routing the flows from agent i to agent j and by contradiction we can prove statement (ii).
Extensions of Uniform Rule
Both Egalitarian and Edge fair are extensions of the uniform rule whereas edge fair is a consistent extension of the uniform rule.
Model 2: Agents on Edges
As in Section 3, we consider the problem of transferring a single commodity from the set S of suppliers to the set D of demanders using a set E of edges: each edge e = (i, j) links a distinct supplier-demanded pair. However, here we think of the supplier and demander nodes as passive, whereas each edge e is controlled by a distinct agent who has single-peaked preferences R e over the amount of flow on edge e. We think of the "peak" u e of his preference relation as the capacity of the associated edge. We write R for the set of single peaked preferences over R + , and R E for the set of preference profiles. Transfer of the commodity is allowed between supplier i and demander j only if (i, j) ∈ E. We let G = (S ∪ D, E) be the natural bipartite graph. As before we focus our attention on peak only mechanisms: in a such a mechanism, the flow depends on the preferences of the agents only through their peaks, so we could simply ask each agent e to report their peak u e . We assume that the supplies s i and demands d j are fixed, and the only varying quantity are the reported peaks (equivalently, edge-capacities).
Pareto flows. The set of Pareto efficient allocations can be complicated because of the peaks of the edge-agents. For example, suppose there are two suppliers {a, b}, two demanders {c, d}, and edges {(a, c), (a, d), (b, d)}. Suppose all peaks are 1. Then the flow given by sending 1 unit of flow along the edge (a, d) is Pareto optimal; as is the flow given by sending a unit along each of the edges (a, c) and (b, d). In the latter flow 2 units are sent from the supply to demand nodes whereas only 1 unit is transferred in the former.
In contrast to model 1, therefore, it is possible that a Pareto optimal flow does not result in a maximum-flow from supply to demand nodes. For that reason, we assume that the planner implements a max-flow in the given problem (G, s, d, u), and we consider the question of how this max-flow is distributed across the edge-agents. In other words, we focus on the fair division of a max-flow, interpreting max-flow as a design constraint. Let F be the set of max-flows.
Restricting ourselves only to max-flows, it is easy to see that the Pareto set is convex: the average of any two max-flows is itself a max-flow. In contrast to model 1, any change in flow along an edge affects the agent's utility directly; in model 1, because the agents were located at the nodes, it is possible for different edge-flows to give the same allocation to the set of agents. This implies that every element of F is a Pareto allocation.
It is natural to try to formulate this "edge"-flow problem as a bipartite rationing problem on an auxiliary graph. For example, consider the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition for the given network (G, s, d, u), and suppose the partitions are S + , S − for the suppliers, and D + , D − for the demanders. From the GE decomposition, every edge between S − and D − carries flow equal to capacity, so their allocation if fixed in all solutions in F; likewise for all edges between S + and D + . This suggests the following idea: create a bipartite graph with one node on the left for each edge, and one node on the right for each element of S + ∪ D + ; each edge that still remains is incident to either S + or D + , but not both; moreover, the given problem is a rationing problem in the sense that the nodes on the right must be fully allocated. Thus it appears that we have Remark. If we draw the bipartite graph suggested in the discussion before the statement of the proposition, and treat it as a bipartite rationing problem, we find that edges (1, 1) and (2, 1) will carry a flow of 1.5 and 3.05 units each, and this exceeds the total demand at D1. These implied "side-constraints" are not accounted for in translating the given problem to a bipartite rationing problem.
Allocation Rules. We can apply the edge-fair rule discussed earlier on this model as well. The edge-fair rule finds a lex-optimal max-flow. It is clear that the rule is also edge consistent. Our next result shows that every edge-consistent rule is also group strategyproof.
Theorem 3 Fix a graph G with the supply vector s and demand vector d. Suppose we have an allocation rule that maps reports of edge-capacities to a flow. Every edge-consistent allocation rule is group strategyproof.
Proof. Consider a coalition of agents A = {e ∈ E|u ′ e = u e }, i.e., they misreport their true peaks. Let the misreported profile be denoted by R ′ ∈ R |E| and the resulting network by G ′ . Note that the edge-fair rule always results in an allocation z ≤ u, hence any agent e ∈ A should report u ′ e ≥ z e ; otherwise, z ′ e ≤ u ′ e < z e and the agent e is worse off in profile R ′ . Let B := {e ∈ A|z e = u e }. The agents in B should have the allocation z ′ e = u e when the reports are R ′ as every such agent received their peak allocation in profile R. Consider the graph G \ B by removing the agents in B to form the reduced graph (G \ B, s G\B , d G\B , u ′ ), where s G\B , d G\B are the adjusted peaks of supply and demand nodes respectively after fixing the flow on the agents in B.
By edge-consistency of the rule, the allocation z ′ e = z ′ e (−B) for all e ∈ G \ B. From the discussion above, the report of every agent e ∈ G\B is such that c ′ ij ≥ z ij . Also, note that z ij < u ij ∀ ij ∈ G\B.
By increasing the capacity of an unsaturated edge, the total value of the maximum flow does not change and the bottleneck points remain the same when the edge fair rule is applied to components (G\B, s G\B , d G\B , c ′ ) and (G\B, s G\B , d G\B , c). Hence, every agent ij ∈ A receives the allocation z ′ ij = z ij .
We next turn to equity properties of allocations and allocation rules. Given that different edges may connect possibly different suppliers and demanders who may have supply or demand different amounts of the commodity, one has to be careful in formulating these notions. Following Bochet et al. [5] , we formulate these properties for a pair of agents (equivalently, edges). In general these properties take the following form: Fix a problem (G, s, d, u), and consider the allocation z given by a rule ϕ. For every pair of edges e and e ′ , fix the flows on all edges other than e and e ′ and ask if there is a "better" feasible flow in F.
An allocation is envy-free if whenever e prefers z e ′ to z e (for some agents e and e ′ ), there is no other allocationẑ ∈ {z ′ ∈ F | z ′ f = z f , ∀f = e, e ′ } such that e prefersẑ to z. An allocation z satisfies equal treatment of equals (ETE) if for each e and e ′ with u e = u e ′ , there is no other allocationẑ ∈ {z ′ ∈ F | z ′ f = z f , ∀f = e, e ′ } with |ẑ e −ẑ e ′ | < |z e − z e ′ |. The following result shows the relationship between these two properties.
still feasible because the set F is convex. This is a contradiction to the earlier obtained solution of the LP at the step when e ′ was a bottleneck. Hence, edge fair satisfies no envy in this model thus treats equals equally.
